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Introduction
 This paper examines profitability of value pricing schemes in the United States. First it 
introduces road pricing in general and common as-applied scenarios. Second, it provides 
background on welfare impacts of road pricing and the economic impacts of profitability in road 
pricing. Third, it examines facilities in the United States that have been developed recently, 
examining their operations, revenues, expenses, and profitability. Finally, it summarizes and 
compares these facilities and their profitability outcomes in light of the need for a socially-
positive welfare outcome for successful equitable implementation of road pricing schemes.
 Funding road transportation has begun a transition from large-scale user fees on gasoline 
to a smaller-scale set of fees related to individual facilities. Charging users of individual facilities 
has common in major urbanized areas around the world, with prominent schemes in Stockholm, 
London, Singapore, and other cities. In the United States, a reluctance on the part of government 
entities to raise taxes on motor fuels has created a need for secondary funding sources. US 
DOT’s Federal Highway Administration has funded studies, demonstration programs, and 
implementation programs in the past 10 years with the intent of creating viable directly-priced 
facilities.
 Road pricing has gained in popularity in recent years with the introduction of automatic 
toll collection systems that remove the labor costs from direct toll collection. They also allow 
vehicles to traverse a toll booth much faster than toll collection involving an individual 
performing the toll collection. Electronic toll collection also allows for much easier modification 
of toll amounts, allowing dynamic toll pricing in response to stimuli. Congestion pricing arose 
out of these developments, which allows a facility administrator to vary the price of usage to 
arrive at a target volume or revenue for the time period under observation. Congestion charging 
converts users’ implicit value of time in their decisions to drive on congested facilities to an 
explicit one that attempts to allow users to spend less time (but more money) on their trips 
through congested areas.
 In the United States, congestion charging has been most commonly implemented as value 
pricing, a subset of variable tolling that provides parallel facilities with some of the lanes priced 
and some unpriced. This paradigm arose because of the preexisting high-occupancy vehicle 
(HOV) lanes on many highways in the United States, lanes with restrictions on usage based on 
vehicle occupancy, usually either 2+ or 3+ persons have to be in a vehicle to use the lane. After 
these lanes were built, much of the time they were underused, encouraging researchers to explore 
new policies that would improve uptake of these lanes (Stockton & Daniels, 2000). Out of this 
research came the addition of a priced capability to add users to these lanes, creating High-
Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes. Most of the projects studied in this research are HOT conversion 
projects.
 Out of these trends and efforts several projects have arisen. A snapshot of projects that 
have been open long enough to evaluate will be examined here for their results in terms of 
profitability and welfare for society. Projects range from the oldest example in the United States, 
SR-91 in Orange County, California, to one of the newest, the 95 Express lanes in Miami, 
Florida. Each project will be examined for comparison purposes with regard to operation, costs, 
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and revenues that result from the projects and their stated and actual uses. Before this analysis, 
though, a background on the justification of direct road pricing schemes is offered, with 
particular emphasis on the welfare analysis that has been discussed in road pricing and provides 
theoretical justification for these new pricing regimes.
 Value pricing as implemented in the United States generally involves a 2-lane HOT 
facility with limited ingress and egress over a short span of the most congested portions of a 
major highway in a metropolitan area. Tolls are collected electronically (no option for toll 
booths) and paid for using prepaid credit in an account linked to a transponder mounted on the 
windshield in the vehicle. Enforcement mechanisms generally involve highway patrol and, in 
some cases, electronic identification of vehicle occupancy and identification using cameras that 
determine front passenger seat occupancy and then, if necessary, take a photograph of the 
vehicle’s license plate to send a notice and fine to the vehicle owner. 
 Current literature on road pricing generally revolves around implementation issues 
(prices to charge, enforcement and user awareness, technical issues surrounding transponders and 
facility routing, etc.) and the theoretical basis for road pricing in economic theory (Verhoef, 
2008). Much of the analysis conducted on existing facilities has focused on operations and 
improvement, such as surveying users for their attitudes about the facilities and ways to improve 
customer service processes (Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, 2006). Other research has 
looked at equity in road pricing: the ability to pay for less time spent in congested travel is 
intuitively for those with more funds than time, that is, those for whose time is worth more to 
them and they can afford to pay for the conversion, thus giving these facilities the derisive name 
“Lexus Lanes” (Hymon, 2007).  Equity in road pricing has been studied extensively, with the 
conclusion “that the perception of unfairness may be exaggerated...the perception that congestion 
pricing is an inequitable way of responding to the problem of traffic congestion does not appear 
to be borne out by experience” (Federal Highway Administration, 2009). Research has not 
tended toward evaluation of projects based on their outcomes, such as profitability and using 
those profits for other projects. In the next section background for the necessary profitability of 
these systems will become clear.
Road Pricing and Welfare
 Theoretical justification for road pricing begins with the limited resources that create 
congestion.  Convergence of route, place, and time create desirable locations for travel patterns 
that fill up road networks (Downs, 2004). Some of this is caused by geography: in Southern 
California, SR-91 is the primary route between Orange and Riverside Counties, and mountain 
ranges mean that a parallel route is impractical. Other areas have simple land use reasons for 
congestion, such as the sprawl of Atlanta, with no natural barriers to land consumption. 
Congested facilities also experience a decline in volume as compared to facilities operating at 
free-flow speed. Average maximum volume for a lane of highway on flat terrain is 2,200 
passenger cars/lane/hour at 60 miles per hour, but a greater amount of users attempting to enter 
the highway creates break down conditions that allow fewer vehicles through the highway 
(Transportation Research Board, 2000). 
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 Efficient economic outcomes for congested facilities would theoretically begin with 
dynamically-priced distance-based charges. Depending on the actual facility and its level of 
crowding, each additional vehicle desiring to travel on a near-capacity facility would be charged 
progressively more until some potential users decided to use a different route, which would keep 
the facility from becoming overloaded and breaking down. This might mean that speed on the 
facility would be maximized; depending on the amount of revenue that would be generated, 
though, this could could also mean that profits generated would go into some socially-efficient 
use that would mitigate the amount of revenue generated by the scheme. Simply speaking, this is 
the first-best pricing scheme, that every mile is charged for at dynamic marginal rates that 
maximize the road facility’s capacity, keeping each link as full as possible but not over-
congested. First-best pricing also assumes that the entire network is marginally priced. The first-
best model is not practical in any developed area due to the resistance of the public to such a 
scheme, the non-trivial technical difficulties to developing such a system, and the need for a full-
scale equilibrium model; that is, modeling the outcomes for the whole of society is needed to 
achieve pricing guidance for a first-best pricing system. (Yang & Huang, 2005). In terms of 
societal welfare, this model does maximize everyone’s willingness to pay for a road network, so 
it is effective at creating more economic welfare but also does require that revenues generated 
end up in some positive activity such as alternative transportation modes.
 Since first-best models for road pricing are complex and impractical for implementation, 
second-best pricing models involve some aspects of the first-best model but do not implement 
them fully. They might be link-limited (on one or a few facilities), price-limited (a fixed toll for 
use of a bottleneck, such as a bridge), spatially-limited (charges to use a specific geographic 
area), or delay-limited (only charged when volume exceeds breakdown conditions) (Yang & 
Huang, 2005, p. 81). These schemes typically use limited application on significant portions of a 
road network to maximize effectiveness. They use partial-equilibrium modeling to determine 
proper pricing on an individual link or links on a network. Partial-equilibrium modeling 
simplifies analysis to allow pre-operation estimates of usage, pricing, and revenue. Most priced 
facilities, and the facilities in discussion here, fall under this category of models.
 In particular, the application of a second-best pricing model to a facility with two 
portions, one price and one unpriced, is the primary application of variable road pricing in the 
United States. Facilities consist of two lanes of variably-priced, limited-entry and exit roadway 
in the median of an existing facility. Since these links are exactly parallel to unpriced facilities 
modeling behavior on the network becomes much simpler. 
 Within these second-best pricing schemes the heterogeneity of users and the dissimilarity 
of network entry, exit, and design create equity impacts that affect different facility users in 
different ways. In particular, it can be shown that users with different values of time are affected 
differently by a direct charge for the use of a facility. Heterogenous time values creates 
heterogenous disutilities for travel on the facility. A user’s value of time means that as the time 
cost and monetary cost of facility usage change a user’s overall disutility for the facility can 
change. Users of a tolled facility with a lower value of time tend to have a higher disutility for 
travel on priced facilities; that is, “lower-income users are more likely to be made worse off than 
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before” (Yang & Huang, 2005, p. 208). Analysis of users’ heterogenous values of time have 
allowed the creation of terms like “Lexus Lanes” to describe value priced facilities.
 In order to mitigate the impact of these disutilities on users new projects need to program 
for the revenue from congestion pricing to be redistributed to another portion of society that 
could make use of the welfare increase. On a practical level, some of the facilities advertise their 
contributions to high-quality bus service in the same corridor, while others do little to inform the 
public of their efforts to transfer funds away from direct users to provide alternatives to the value 
priced facility. On a theoretical level, there are many options for revenue redistribution to other 
modes. Revenue redistribution, however, is important to the welfare situation for these facilities, 
as Parry (2001) and Small (1992) emphasize as secondary points to their discussion of possible 
outlets for congestion pricing revenues. For congestion pricing to result in significant disutility 
reductions in a local environment, facilities need to be profitable and transfer those profits to a 
project or program that both the public identifies as acceptable and creates direct welfare gains to 
society.
Current Project Description
In this analysis, projects to be covered in greater or less detail include:
Table 1: Facilities Analyzed
Facility Name Parallel 
Facility
Administrative Entity Location
91 Express Lanes SR-91 Orange County Transportation 
Authority
Orange County, 
California
FasTrak Express Lanes I-15 San Diego Association of Governments San Diego County, 
California
I-25 HOV Express 
Lanes
I-25 Colorado High Performance 
Transportation Enterprise
Denver, Colorado
MnPass I-394 Minnesota Department of 
Transportation
Minneapolis, Minnesota
95 Express I-95 Florida Department of Transportation Miami, Florida
These projects are of varying age, operational status and length, with the SR-91 being the oldest 
and the 95 Express project being the newest. MnPass was recently expanded to another facility in 
Minneapolis (I-35W), but the relative newness means that analysis is not appropriate at this time. 
The FasTrak program has future plans to expand in length along I-15 and also to other facilities 
around the San Diego metropolitan area.
 All projects include certain similarities that make some simplifications and comparisons 
practical. Adding another source of explicit revenue generation to the transportation system is 
generally something that most people oppose, and public involvement strategies to gain the 
general public’s approval for these projects has been controversial, in some cases taking many 
years (Buckeye & Munnich, 2006). Projects are generally marketed extensively to provide 
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explanations to users of the facilities as to what they need to use the facility (a transponder) and 
where they can enter/exit the facility. Tolls are generally only higher than $1 during peak times, 
with the 91 Express Lanes peak toll of $9.90 from 4 PM to 5 PM on Thursday afternoon being 
the highest actual toll a user might have to pay to use one of these facilities. Significant 
differences exist in number of users and facility design with regard to entry/egress. Some of the 
projects operate as independent entities with issued financial statements and comprehensive 
details of operations; others are sub-groups within state Departments of Transportation, which 
makes some information on operations more opaque.
91 Express Lanes Description
 The 91 Express Lanes are the oldest value-priced facility in the United States and are also 
unique in their organizational history as a long-term lease to a private enterprise to attempt to 
lower costs on this new expansion. Orange County Transportation encountered problems with 
expanding a parallel facility due to contractual obligations regarding demand on the facility 
(expanding a parallel facility might have resulted in less demand for the 91 Express Lanes) and 
were able to get citizens to issue bonds to buy out the private enterprise. The facility’s revenues 
are now mostly used to pay for the bonds issued to purchase the facility. Design of the facility is 
two lanes in each direction with no ingress or egress except at the end points (near SR-55 in 
Orange County and the Riverside County line). Toll schedules are set and revised every 6 
months, not priced in a truly dynamic fashion. Tolls are designed to maximize traffic flow in the 
facility. The facility is generally regarded as a success and has been a laboratory for equity issues 
in value pricing. Early surveys of users (to determine if they were all ‘Lexus’-type users) were 
important in justifying the facilities despite their equity impacts on persons with low values of 
time (e.g., lower-income users). Revenues from the facility are used primarily to cover debt 
service. As of 2008, the facility had bond and other significant liabilities of $206.2 million, with 
no expenses related to revenue transfers to other areas of transportation or welfare gains. Facility 
usage has been consistently high, although variations in economic conditions have contributed to 
less revenue than previous years.
Table 2: 91 Express Lanes Revenues and Users (91 Express Lanes)
Fiscal 
Year
Actual 
Average Daily 
Transactions
Projected 
Average Daily 
Transactions
Percent 
of 
Projecti
ons
Actual Toll 
Revenues
Projecte
d Toll 
Revenue
s
Percent of 
Projections
2009 32,978 32,700 101% $36,048,000.00 $35,500,000.00102%
2008 36,824 40,400 91% $39,636,000.00 $45,000,000.0088%
2007 40,110 35,400 113% $40,574,000.00 $34,700,000.00117%
2006 38,860 33,700 115% $37,510,000.00 $31,800,000.00118%
2005 34,900 32,100 109% $32,518,000.00 $29,100,000.00112%
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Fiscal 
Year
Actual 
Average Daily 
Transactions
Projected 
Average Daily 
Transactions
Percent 
of 
Projecti
ons
Actual Toll 
Revenues
Projecte
d Toll 
Revenue
s
Percent of 
Projections
2004 30,600 30,300 101% $26,972,000.00 $26,400,000.00102%
For fiscal 2008 (July 2007-June 2008), the 91 Express Lanes took in $46,236,247 in revenue 
(includes fees and fines in addition to actual toll revenue) and spent $23,396,655 on operating 
expenses associated with administration of the facility, including operating the toll scheme and 
facility maintenance, as well as facility depreciation. The largest item after depreciation was 
contracted services for toll operations at $5.9 million. This leads to average revenue per 
transaction of $2.86 and an average cost per transaction of $1.67, or over the 10-mile length of 
the facility, $0.17 per vehicle-mile traveled. Revenue:costs ratio is thus 1.9 including 
depreciation of the facility.
FasTrak Express Lanes Description
 FasTrak Express Lanes in San Diego County were begun as a specific HOT conversion 
project in 1996 (San Diego Association of Governments, 2010b). It has always been public (as 
opposed to SR-91). The project has evolved over time and never been judged “complete”, such 
that the current project scope involves more facility expansion as well as eventual expansion to 
other corridors in the greater San Diego area. The facility uses 16 miles of I-15 north of San 
Diego with multiple entry/exit points along its length. The southern 8 miles are 2 reversible lanes 
with limited hours, while the northern 8 miles are complete with 2 lanes of travel in each 
direction. Tolling recently changed to a distance-based charge (depending on entry/exit point) 
that also varies based on congestion level. User knowledge of tolls is incomplete if they do not 
exit the facility at a location listed on the overhead message board indicating their toll. Scale of 
participation in FasTrak is much lower than SR-91, as is revenue, while facilities are longer and 
more elaborate.
Table 3: FasTrak Revenues and Users (San Diego Association of Governments, 2010a)
Year Fastrak Daily 
Users
Revenue
2004 5,104 $3,009,000
2005 5,023 $2,064,000
2006 4,929 $2,523,000
2007 4,869 $2,544,000
2008 4,785 $2,448,000
2009 4,208 $3,516,000
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FasTrak’s capital funding has mostly come from local direct sources, with San Diego’s local 
transportation sales tax, TransNet, funding much of the capital cost, projected to be over $1 
billion. While revenues for SR-91 seemed to follow cyclical economic trends while still 
remaining positive, monthly revenue totals for FasTrak show a much less clear trend. Project 
operating costs budgeted for 2010 are $3,975,334, and for 2009 were $3,082,329 (San Diego 
Association of Governments, 2009, 2010b). Most of these figures are for contracted services for 
operations ($2.6 million in 2010, $2.0 million in 2009). Cost figures do not include long-term 
maintenance or depreciation of facilities. Reported toll revenues at $3,009,000 are approximately 
in line with budgeted costs. Surplus funding is indicated as transferred to transit programs, 
$597,000 in 2009 and $1.0 million in 2010. Not counting transfers to transit programs, in 2009 
the program had a revenue:cost ratio of 1.21.
I-25 HOV Express Lanes
 The I-25 HOV Express Lanes are operated by the Colorado High Performance 
Transportation Enterprise entity of the Colorado Department of Transportation; the facility 
opened in 2006. The facility consists of two reversible lanes in the median of I-25, operating 
southbound in the morning and northbound in the afternoon. Tolls range from a low of $.50 to as 
high as $3.50 or more and are designed to maximize traffic volume on the facility. Facility 
operations began in 2006 and capital costs were funded from general highway revenues. 
Revenues are to be used solely on operations and improvement of the I-25 Express Lanes.
Table 4: I-25 Express Lanes Revenue and Users (Colorado Department of Transportation, 2009)
Fiscal Year Average Daily Users Revenue
2007 10,467 $1,570,500
2008 12,111 $2,319,600
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Figure 1: FasTrak Revenues (San Diego Association of Governments, 2010a)
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Revenue
Fiscal Year Average Daily Users Revenue
2009 11,157 $2,150,300
Note: Revenue reported for fiscal year (July-June)
Revenues in the first year shown were significantly affected by the opening of the facility, that is, 
the first months of operation were significant outliers in terms of users and revenue. Over the 
course of the facility’s history, revenue peaked in late 2007-early 2008 as with the short-term 
history of similar facilities. Expenses in fiscal 2009 totaled $1.46 million, which were evenly 
distributed among operations costs (support and maintenance) and repayment of debt issued to 
support startup costs until the facility is self-sufficient. Toll collection costs were $376,604 
(Colorado High Performance Trasnportation Enterprise, 2009). Fiscal 2009 revenue:cost ratio 
was 1.38.
MnPass
 The MnPass program is administered by Minnesota Department of Transportation and 
operates as an integrated entity within the DOT without a separate organizational or reporting 
structure. The design of the facility includes 1-2 reversible lanes open during peak hours and 
open to any traffic on weekends and overnight hours. The program began in 2005 on I-394 and 
has recently opened on I-35W. Much of the system’s emphasis has been on marketing and public 
relations due to high levels of opposition to the program (Buckeye & Munnich, 2006). There is 
little public indication as to where profits might go if they were to occur.
Table 5: Mn Pass Revenue and Users (Buckeye, 2007)
Year Average Daily Users Revenue
2006 2,320 $738,000
2007 2,740 $1,255,000
Note: Revenue reported for fiscal year (July-June)
The rise in revenue was somewhat expected because the early portion of fiscal 2006 was just 
after the facility opened, and facilities have typically had more users after commuters have 
become used to seeing the facility and deciding if the monetary cost is worthwhile. Cost data 
were limited in availability due to the organizational structure of the MnPass program. Other 
states and programs typically place their organizations outside the regular departmental structure 
of a large organization, but this program rests within that structure and so the costs are more 
difficult to estimate. If one were to this program to Colorado’s I-25 HOV Express Lanes 
operating costs, then the $1.255 million that the program generated in 2007 would be just enough 
to cover these direct operating costs ($1.15 million in Colorado). The MnPass program would 
not be able to cover capital costs associated with implementation without significant increases in 
usage. Revenue to cost ratio estimate would be 1.09.
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95 Express
 Miami’s 95 Express program is the newest value priced facility under study here. The 
lanes opened in December 2008. The facility consists of 2 lanes in opposing directions in the 
median of I-95. The project is opening in phases, with 6.2 miles of the northbound portion 
completed at opening, and the matching southbound portion opened in January 2010. The project 
was accomplished through an Urban Partnership Agreement between the Florida Department of 
Transportation, the local transit agencies in Miami and Broward County, and associated other 
agencies to coordinate the implementation of a strategy to increase mobility on I-95 with a HOT 
lane conversion and increased transit service in the corridor. Capital costs were paid for by 
Florida Department of Transportation funding (state and federal fuel taxes). Tolls ranged from a 
low of $0.25 to a high of $5.00.
Table 6: 95 Express Revenue and Users (Florida Department of Transportation District 6, 2010)
Month Average Daily 
Users
Revenue
Dec-08 19,700 $246,000
Jan-09 21,600 $383,000
Feb-09 22,800 $393,000
Mar-09 24,100 $481,000
Apr-09 24,000 $424,000
May-09 23,500 $438,000
Jun-09 23,100 $404,000
Jul-09 22,900 $400,000
Aug-09 23,000 $371,000
Sep-09 22,800 $396,000
Oct-09 23,700 $420,000
Nov-09 23,300 $425,000
Dec-09 23,200 $472,000
Jan-10 48,735 $740,048
The data above show that users on the 95 Express system are higher than any other system. The 
January 2010 numbers also show a significant increase because the southbound lanes opened on 
January 15. Future numbers that include a whole month would likely show another increase in 
users  Revenue in the first 12 months was $4.78 million, the highest of any facility examined 
here except SR-91. A simple cost figure for the first 7 months of operation was $3.25 million, 
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significantly higher than Colorado’s program, but comparable to FasTrak and lower than SR-91. 
While these costs do mean that the projects operating expenses were more than their revenues, 
the overall magnitude of income and the expansion of the project should allow for profitability in 
the future. Project revenues have no specific outcome source, although revenues may end up in 
maintenance funds for the corridor. Revenue:cost ratio for the first 7 months of operation was 
0.852.
Project Comparison
 The projects described above each have strengths and weaknesses in their implementation 
and outcome measures. Significantly, none of the projects except for FasTrak have an explicit 
mandate to transfer profits (assuming that facilities are profitable) to relieve some local disutility, 
such as improving transit service. All but SR-91’s capital costs were paid for out of more general 
funding measures which means that some other projects were not and are not being funded to 
allow these projects to happen. While time series gaps mean that direct comparisons of yearly 
revenues are difficult, averaging individual months many allow more concrete analysis.
Table 7: Month of July Users and Revenue in Systems Studied
Facility (n=number of 
months average)
Average Daily Users Revenue
91 Express Lanes (n=7) 1,010,684 $2,616,631
FasTrak Express Lanes (n=6) 4,037 $192,429
I-25 HOV Express Lanes (n=3) 11,325 $144,150
MnPass (n=2) 2,030 $45,704
95 Express (n=1) 22,900 $400,000
Considering that operational features of these systems are not very dissimilar from each other, 
the differences among the systems studied seem quite different. While parts of some of these 
systems are reversible or one lane only, this would presumably lead to perhaps 50% less traffic 
from one system to another. In this case the difference between the largest system and the 
smallest system is about 500%. One way to correct these numbers is to examine the potential 
user base of the facility by looking at both the total number of vehicles that use the facility and 
the degree of crowding on the facility. These numbers are reported below:
Table 8: Volume and Congestion on Facilities Studied
Facility AADT LOS
91 Express Lanes 278000 F
FasTrak Express Lanes 224000 E
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Facility AADT LOS
I-25 HOV Express Lanes 207000 E
MnPass 148000 B
95 Express 193000 D
 Using the figures from Table 8, a correlation can be drawn between the revenue figures 
for each facility and the amount of traffic and its relative congestion level. The level of service 
(LOS) on these facilities is simply an estimate based on peak 15-minute vehicle density drawn 
from given figures in the Highway Capacity Manual (2000), so some of the letters could be less 
accurate than others. Most of these LOS figures used given stanadards for K30 (30th most used 
hour of traffic on the facility and average design capacity for urban freeways, average value of 
0.091) and D (the directional split, average value of 0.6 for the peak direction on urban freeways) 
from the Highway Capacity Manual, but the Florida DOT had facility-specific numbers for K30 
and D, so standard values were not used there. In general, Minnesota’s facility has significantly 
fewer potential customers who experience less congestion than any of the other facilities.
Facility Evaluation of Welfare Effects
 The primary aim of this discussion is to examine as-implemented facilities in the United 
States for their profitability and thus their impact on welfare in the local economies that the 
facilities were designed to improve. All of the facilities except for 95 Express were at least 
marginally profitable based on their operating expenses. None of the facilities, however, had 
been able to pay for their capital costs, although SR-91’s revenues are being used explicitly to 
repay bonds issued to purchase the facility from its private lessee. Profitability has to be judged 
first in terms of those capital costs. Since four of the facilities’ capital costs came from more 
general funding sources such as transportation sales taxes and highway revenues, is the 
opportunity cost of expanding these facilities in this way the most efficient use of these funds, or 
might there be a better bottleneck or capacity expansion in another part of the local area under 
study? Some of these areas might have had a busier facility to put the first HOT conversion on as 
well, although the 95 Express lanes seem to have gone onto the most-traveled road in that 
metropolitan area, some of the other areas, particularly Minnesota’s MnPass program, might 
have encountered more success if there were a higher-trafficked facility to use. Comparing 
capital costs to international pricing schemes supports the trend that even the most heavily-used 
facilities have much of their revenue tied up in repaying capital costs associated with developing 
a new project. London’s cordon charging scheme has generated significant amounts of revenue 
(almost $1.5 billion from inception in 2002 to 2007) but has net profit after capital costs of $15 
million over that time period, numbers significantly better than the schemes outlined here, but 
nevertheless not a significant generator of new funds for other projects, although the welfare 
effects of the project have generally been calculated as positive (Mahon & Sloan, p. 20; Santos & 
Fraser, 2005). 
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Table 10: Facility Profit and Revenue Goals
Facility Operating 
Margin (last 
year reported)
Operating 
Profit
Goal for Profits
91 Express Lanes 90% (FY08) $22,839,592 Repay capital costs
FasTrak Express Lanes 21% (FY09) $597,000 Transfer to transit in corridor
I-25 HOV Express 
Lanes
38% (FY09) $591,399 Maintain facility
MnPass 9% (est.) $105,000 Return to general transportation funding
95 Express (14.8%) (Dec08-
Jun09)
-$481,000 Return to general transportation funding
 Maintenance and depreciation also play a role in costs for these facilities. The largest line 
item in operating expenses for SR-91 is the depreciation associated with the aging of the facility, 
while none of the other facility costs take this figure into account, eventually requiring even 
more general transportation funds to repair aging infrastructure. In terms of operating expenses 
and revenues, the amount of money generated in value pricing does not seem to have a great 
enough magnitude to replace or create significant new opportunities in transportation alternatives 
near the corridor expanded. Even though “the economic theory behind congestion pricing relies 
on using the revenues to help compensate highway users” only San Diego’s FasTrak program has 
an explicit policy in place to transfer profits to transit service in the corridor (Small, 1992, p. 
359). The relationship between transit and highway use in Colorado’s I-25 HOV Express Lanes 
is even built on checks and balances - a rate increase on the express bus service that serves the 
I-25 corridor required an increase in the peak toll on the express lanes that the buses use (the fare 
and peak toll both rose from $3.25 to $3.50, not due to the amount of congestion on the facility). 
Facility profitability has not been included in much of the actual design of current value priced 
facilities in the United States, which has led to situations where the current implementation 
probably was not the most efficient use of the capital involved in the construction of the value 
priced facility.
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